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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Justice Hamiter dissented on the ground that the proximate cause
of the accident and injury was not the stack of lumber with its
galvanized iron covering but the fact that the child tripped during
play on some other and disconnected object. He felt that if an
iron chair had been at the same place the injury could have hap-
pened just as easily.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
REVERSIONS-SERVITUDE AND LEASE
One of the interesting developments in the jurisprudence
since the last resum6 involves what the court in Gailey v. Mc-
Farlain1 termed a "reversionary interest." In that case the court
expressed the opinion that such an interest could be dealt with,
but under the test of intention had not been dealt with in the
contract under consideration.
In later cases, apparently because of obvious difficulties of
application of prescription and possible dangers to settled prin-
ciples of public policy, the court strengthened resistance to the
concept by deciding that a vendor dealing with the possibility of
reversion was simply selling something that he did not own.
During the past year, in at least three important decisions, the
court has adhered to the non-recognition policy. Long-Bell
Petroleum Company v. Tritico 2 may be said to stand for a denial
under the theory of the sale of a thing not owned; it was cited
by the court for this principle in McMurrey v. Gray.3 The latter
case is emphatic on the point and grounds strongly on the public
policy argument advanced by Chief Justice O'Niell in McDonald
v. Richard,4 wherein, incidentally, the idea was further blighted
by the word "so-called" consistently prefixing the phrase "rever-
sionary interest" used by the court in Gailey v. McFarlain.5
In Liberty Farms v. Miller,6 the court again in no uncertain
terms negates the reservation, termed a reversionary "right" in
this case, grounding in part on the theory of sale of property not
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
2. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
3. 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949).
4. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
5. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
6. 216 La. 1023, 45 So. 2d 610 (1950).
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owned, citing McDonald v. Richard,7 Gulf Refining Company v.
Orr,8 and Long-Bell Petroleum Company v. Tritico9
It is clear that the court feels an evolution of this concept is
inimical to the best interests of the state. If it should occur that
a landowner with clear intent had sold the reversion and upon
the lapse of the original servitude still retained the land, the
court might experience difficulty in maintaining denial of the
rights of the vendee under the sale-of-a-thing-not-owned doctrine
and cases cited in Gailey v. McFarlain.10
In Vincent v. Bullock11 the court faced up to the proposition
that the owner of a valuable, merchantable right may deal with
it if not prohibited by the law or the public policy of the state.
They proceeded to find an available legal pattern by which the
new material might be governed in an orderly and useful man-
ner. A reasonable prescriptive period was then applied.
Certainly the expected reversion, particularly in the declin-
ing years of an outstanding servitude, is a thing of value to the
landowner and might be a very useful purchase for a prospective
producer in making pooling agreements or other contracts secur-
ing an area for development. There are several existing legal
patterns into which the idea might fit, more convenient, perhaps,
than those available for the justices who dealt with Vincent v.
Bullock.12 Because considerations of public policy prevent the
practical use of the doctrine, however, it may well be that this
"certain object" of commerce disappeared concurrently with its
announcement of being.
As suggested above, the situation wherein a landowner, hav-
ing sold his hope of the expiration of an outstanding servitude,
retains the land until the date of the extinction of the original
servitude has not yet been definitely litigated. For the decision
in Gailey v. McFarlain,13 in which this hope of extinguishment
was said to be an object of commerce, the court relied on Gayoso
Company v. Arkansas Natural Gas Company. 14 This case, decided
in 1933, stated that a lease granted by a landowner eight and
one-half years after his vendor of the land had reserved all of
the minerals was valid and the transaction a proper one, no use
7. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
8. 207 La. 915, 22 So. 2d 269 (1945).
9. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
10. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
11. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
12. Ibid.
13. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
14. 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933).
1951]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of the servitude having been made during its life term by its
owners, or of course, by the landowner's lessee. In this connec-
tion the recent case of Wier v. Glassell15 is of interest. Therein,
recognition is incidentally given to the validity of a so-called top
lease, obtained by a sublessee from the landowner while the orig-
inal lease from which the sublessee derived his title was in
existence. Here we find an interesting parallel to the servitude
situation where the landowner deals with his hope of expiration
of a lease while an outstanding lease is still valid.
The public policy of the one situation seems hardly more
inimical to the general welfare than that of the other. The legal
groove into which the new type of royalty was placed in Vincent
v. Bullock"' might also fit dealings with hope of extinction of
servitude even better than it does royalty as the happening of the
future uncertain condition, extinguishment of an outstanding
servitude, clearly is beyond the sole control of the landowner.
These comparisons are entertaining to the writer, af least, and it
is always an uncertainty as to whether they may sometime have
a practical value.
VINCENT-BULLOCK ROYALTY
Further development of the theory of royalty per se, as first
postulated in Vincent v. Bullock1 7 is found in Union Sulphur
Company, Incorporated v. Andrau.18 A short but most interesting
opinion by Chief Justice Fournet clearly and logically proceeds
to the conclusion that production of minerals in paying quanti-
ties must occur within the ten year period to effect an interrup-
tion of prescription. The time element creates an unusual quality
of dramatic suspense as drilling had ceased, oil and gas had been
found and efforts to complete the well as a producer met with
success only three days too late.
SERVITUDE
Liberty Farm V'. Miller is again most interesting for its dis-
cussion and holding on the use of a mineral servitude as security.
The contention was made that a certain agreement set forth a
security title only, by which actual title to the servitude did not
pass but was pledged. The court agreed that there was a clear
intention to give security only but stated that this intention did
not hinder title from passing. Furthermore, the court decided
15. 216 La. 828, 44 So. 2d 882 (1950).
16. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
17. Ibid.
18. 47 So. 2d 38 (La. 1950).
[VOL. XI
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
that pledge of a servitude was impossible since delivery, real or
symbolic, could not be made. Moreover, the court indicated that
if counsel's argument prevailed the bank would have the pledge
of a non-existent security since title to a servitude must be in one
other than the landowner.
Act 97 of 1938,19 providing for the pledging of certain mineral
rights without delivery, is not mentioned in the case as it was
not on the statute books at the time of the execution of the agree-
ment in question and it does not appear that the legislature
intended it to have retroactive effect. The statute does not use
the word servitude but it conceivably might be included under
the broad language "other contracts relating to minerals" and
the like. However, the case by its analysis raises a doubt as to
whether the landowner, even under this interpretation of the act
could pledge his minerals. Regardless of the non-ownership
theory, Act 96 of 193820 might be said to purport to permit a
mortgage of the landowner's minerals separately from his land.
Support by the court for this interpretation of the act seems
unlikely.
CREATION OF SERVITUDE
On rehearing, the court in Long-Bell Petroleum Company v.
Tritico21 adhered to the generally accepted rules of creation of
servitude by sale or reservation of the landowner. The theory of
the first hearing was that a new servitude had been created by
the vendees by virtue of the reservation made by the vendor of
the land since a "sale of land with reservation of the minerals is
equivalent, in other words, to the sale of land and the simultane-
ous reconveyance of the minerals."2
2
AcKNOWLEDGMENT TO INTERRUPT
The court continued in Long-Bell Petroleum Company v.
Tritico,2 3 as in other recent cases, to adhere to the "expressed
and certain intention to interrupt" theory in matters of acknowl-
edgment of servitude. A "mere" or "bare" acknowledgment is
not enough, having as its purpose no more than a declaration of
existing fact for protection against warranty or for clarity and
exactness.
19. La. R.S. (1950) 9:4301-4304.
20. La. R.S. (1950) 9:5101.
21. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
22. 216 La. 426, 438, 43 So. 2d 782, 786.
23. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
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USER
McMurrey v. Gray24 contains another interesting discussion,
that of user. The court indicated, without deciding, 5 that drilling
to the Nacatosh sand was not a valid user of plaintiff's servitude
and hence did not interrupt prescription. However, the court
found that there had been no intent to abandon when defendants
stopped operations and that plaintiff should be permitted to
continue his efforts for a reasonable time by going on to a deeper
sand, the relief for which he asked. Prescription of the servitude
would have accrued on March 29, 1947. Actual drilling operations
were not started until March 16, 1947. The Nacatosh sand was
reached on March 26, 1947. The defendant was not interfered
with until April 4, 1947. Thus, no obstacle was placed in the way
until after the date of accrual of prescription; hence no ordinary
suspension theory would seem to be involved. A reasonable time
for continuance might seem fair and proper under the facts and
pleadings, but a certain rule would be desirable in the writer's
judgment. Doubt may now exist as to the depth which must be
reached as of the date of expiration of the servitude. Proof must
be adduced of intent to continue to the proper depth at which
user sufficient to interrupt prescription would be established.
The date of commencement here seems late in the ten year
period-a matter of only thirteen days before accrual. Would
commencement on the last day be enough if equipment, et cetera,
indicated intent to drill to a depth at which it might be reason-
ably expected that oil could be found in the area? Should the
rule be flexible? Here the Nacatosh sand was reached within the
term of the servitude. Oil had been found there and might have
been discovered, but was not. The court stated that this opera-
tion was not sufficient to constitute user but an extension of time
was given since there was no abandonment or cessation of activi-
ties. To shade any further the time in a ten year period for
completion to the proper depth would seem an unwarranted
extension of the life of the servitude unless bona fide commence-
ment within the period is to be the criterion of user for interrup-
tion, if operations are continued to a proper depth. The clear and
definite rule announced for date of production to interrupt pre-
scription for royalty per se in the hard fact case26 discussed gives
the satisfaction of certainty. Doubt is raised in this user case,
under discussion, even though interruption as such was said by
24. 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949).
25. See Per Curiam, 216 La. 904, 922, 45 So. 2d 73, 79.
26. Union Sulphur Co., Inc. v. Andrau, 47 So. 2d 38 (La. 1950).
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the court on application for a rehearing, not to have been raised
by the pleadings.
SUSPENSION BY MINORITY
The executor of S. G. Sample, of the famous Sample v.
Whitaker suits,2'7 was sued in Davidson v. Bolton28 for damages
for failure to cancel a mineral lease upon land held by the plain-
tiff. The youngest of the Sample heirs came of age on July 31,
1937, when prescription began to run again on the servitude
involved, which would have been valid under the original deci-
sion until August 20, 1946. Act 232 of 1944 cut off the right on
July 26, 1945. The letter to defendants demanding cancellation
of the lease was sent on September 6, 1944, and hence defendant
was not liable in damages since at that date, and incidentally also
as of the date of filing suit, the rights were in effect and refusal
to renounce and cancel was justified. Since suspension of pre-
scription for incapacity has been wiped out,29 this method of
prolonging the life of the servitude will cease to trouble the
court.
SUBLEASE AND RENT ROYALTY
The case of Wier v. Glasse1130 also stands for the settled
proposition that a sublease and not an assignment results regard-
less of label on the instrument if control evidenced by retention
of overriding royalty or otherwise is retained by the original
lessee. The further point is logically made that the overriding
royalty thus attached falls with the lease and does not follow
future leases made by the sublessee. In this case the sublessee
without fraud or estoppel obtained a top lease from the land-
owner while the lease under which he held but which he had not
developed was in existence. The first lease expired at the end of
its primary term; and after the erstwhile sublessee became lessee
under the top lease, he then developed. The original lessee
naturally was anxious to retain by some means a one-sixteenth
royalty, which the original sublessee sloughed off by his fore-
sight, legitimately exercised.
CANCELLATION
Suit was instituted to cancel a mineral lease in Hunter Com-
27. 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); 174 La.
245, 140 So. 37 (1932).
28. 216 La. 677; 44 So. 2d 700 (1950).
29. La. Act 510 of 1950 (La. R.S. [Supp. 1950] 9:5805).
30. 216 La. 828, 44 So. 2d 882 (1950).
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pany, Incorporated v. Vaughn.3 1 The land under lease was pooled
by order of the Commissioner of Conservation during the primary
term of the lease and no minerals were produced from the spe-
cific land or from any of the lands within the pool during the
primary term of the lease in question. The Crichton v. Lee 32 case
was distinguishable on one fact, that production from the pool
ensued during the primary term of the questioned lease, tlhough
not from the land covered by the lease. The instrument in litiga-
tion here took cognizance of the possibility of state intervention,
as it contained a provision to cover such a contingency. Because
of this clause and since the situation in principle was the same
as that of Crichton v. Lee,3 3 the court refused to cancel the lease.
No delay in beginning and continuing construction of the cycling
plant and pressure maintenance system had occurred.
A careful and conscientious survey of evidence occupied the
court in Angelloz v. Southwestern Oil & Refining Company34 in
attempting to ascertain the intention of the parties to a mineral
lease. Admission of extrinsic evidence was approved since the
wording of the document was ambiguous.
OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The most interesting case under this heading was Lakeside
Dairies v. Gregersen,' where the court affirmed a position it had
previously taken that the value of property at the date an option
to purchase is exercised rather than at the date it is originally
given is controlling for purposes of the action of lesion beyond
moiety. The option in question was contained in a lease orig-
inally made in 1942 and was exercised in 1945. The court also
took the sound view that lesion beyond moiety may be urged as
a defense to an action for specific performance brought by the
buyer. In addition to the purchase money to be paid by the
buyer, the seller was to be granted the so-called privilege of re-
buying from the buyer certain of the lots making up the entire
property. The court recognized that this was simply a condi-
tional option to be available to the vendor if and when the
vendee exercised his option and said that if the vendor should
have purchased the lots, the action of lesion would have been
31. 217 La. 459, 46 So. 2d 735 (1950).
32. 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946).
33. Ibid.
34. 215 La. 1056, 42 So. 2d 753 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 510, 46 So. 2d 752 (1950).
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